Case Digests: Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

Atty. Katrina Legarda

by Olive Cachapero

De La Salle University - College of Law

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ANNULMENT OR DECLARATION OF NULLITY

ENRICO VS. MEDINACELI

G.R. NO. 173614, SEPTEMBER 28, 2007

Doctrine:

Nial Case	A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
governs petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.	governs petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage celebrated during the effectivity of the Family Code.
Coverage: ü  Marriages celebrated during effectivity of Civil Code	Coverage: ü  Marriages celebrated on and after March 15, 2003 (this rule being prospective) ü  How about marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code but the action was commenced only after the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC? Does not cover: Cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. (Which law governs this then?)
Petitioner: a person who must be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Ex. heirs	A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

FACTS: 

·         Respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. 

·         Complaint alleged that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962 and begot seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.

In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. 

Petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

·         RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action, citing Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a) that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.  

·         Respondents filed a MR.  

·         RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog, which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living.

ISSUE: Which applies in the case at bar: the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC?

  

HELD:

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because it is the law that governs petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage celebrated during the effectivity of the Family Code. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004.

While it is true that Nial allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

  

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. (a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. 

Rationale: Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.

CARLOS V SANDOVAL

GR 179922, DECEMBER 16, 2008

Doctrine: ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

  

FACTS: 

·         Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. 

·         Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son. Upon Teofilo’s death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 (registered in the name of Teofilo) were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad.

·         In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action against respondents for the declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. 

·         On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. 

·         Petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment and lodged his own motion for summary judgment. 

·         RTC rendered judgment: defendants (respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows: Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license.

·         In the appeal, respondents argued that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad.

·         CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. 

ISSUES:

1)      Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. NO

2)     Whether one who is not a spouse may bring an action for nullity of marriage. Yes if the marriage was celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family code and the plaintiff is a real party-in-interest.

HELD:

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

  

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003 is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.: SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses [Sec. 2(a)].  The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. 

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application. 

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage? NO. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.

ABLAZA V REPUBLIC

G.R. NO. 158298, AUGUST 11, 2010

Doctrine: It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, Petitioner filed in the RTC a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner is not a party to the marriage. CA affirmed this decision. 

ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code. YES if he is a real party-in-interest.

RULES:

The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. 

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1)       Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2)      Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

HELD:

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog, the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license.

NIAL V. BAYADOG: The Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:

VOID	VOIDABLE
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.	Cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties.
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.
For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.	Upon the death of either party, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.

NOTE: Need for Judicial Decree

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. The plaintiff must still be a real party-in-interest.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code. Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased’s estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

 Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresencianos surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required a marriage license for their validity; hence, her participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. 

Remanded to the RTC.

AURELIO V AURELIO

GR 175367, JUNE 6, 2011

Doctrine: Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondent’s complaint been filed after March 15, 2003, this present petition would have been denied since A.M No. 02-11-10-SC prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. (Note: Marriage was celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code but the action was commenced prior to the effectivity of AM 02-11-10-SC, hence the latter Rule cannot be made to apply.)

FACTS:

·         Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988.

·         On May 9, 2002, respondent filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. 

·         Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

·         RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion; ruled that respondent’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial.

·         CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondent’s complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action.

·         Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondent’s petition are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. 

ISSUE: WON the CA violated the applicable law and jurisprudence when it held that the allegations contained in the petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage are sufficient for the court to declare the nullity of the marriage between Vida and Danilo. NO

  

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit: (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

  

HELD:

First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 

This Court finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties.

Given the allegations in respondent’s petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. 

REPUBLIC V CA

G.R. NO. 159594, NOVEMBER 12, 2012

Psychological Incapacity as ground for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

Doctrine: The pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.

FACTS:

·         Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977

·         On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage,

·         Public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina

·         Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour. Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina, Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.

·         Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation, whereby she admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo’s consent and flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold.

·         RTC granted the petition, declaring the marriage a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.

·         CA affirmed; concluded that Eduardo proved Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing that the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital obligations;" and that Catalina’s psychological incapacity had been medically identified, sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.

·         OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform to the guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina); and that Catalina’s refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take care of her husband and their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature warranting the declaration of nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations.

·          OSG further argues that Catalina’s infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of the conjugal home were not grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof that her infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to the marriage, while her abandonment would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalina’s psychological incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to look into Catalina’s past life, attitudes, habits and character as to be able to explain her alleged psychological incapacity; that there was not even a finding of the root cause of her alleged psychological incapacity; and that there appeared to be a collusion between the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.

ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. NONE

DISCUSSION

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

In Santos v. CA, we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, viz:

1)      The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

2)     The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. 

3)     The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. 

4)     Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. 

5)     Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.

6)     The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7)     Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

8)     The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.  

HELD:

Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their appreciation of the scanty evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.

To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without Eduardo’s consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established. Eduardo presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was self-serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted to a court of law.

Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalina’s supposed psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source of vital information that the report missed out on. Aside from rendering a brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline personality disorder, both the report and court testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina.  

Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and meet with other persons, aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes’ report lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed the necessary support for the conclusion that the RTC and the CA reached about Catalina’s psychological incapacity to perform her marital duties. What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced was Catalina’s immaturity and apparent refusal to perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. To rule that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity.

Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo: It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part. Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and Eduardo. To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence in determining the issue of collusion between the spouses.

MENDOZA V REPUBLIC

GR 157854, NOVEMBER 12, 2012

Psychological Incapacity as ground for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

Doctrine: To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.

FACTS:

·         Petitioner and Dominic were in an intimate relationship which led to petitioner’s pregnancy with their daughter. They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991.

·         Petitioner discovered Dominic’s illicit relationship with his co-employee. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms

·         In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance coverage. She soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00. To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister themselves.

·         On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him.

·         On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity  

·         Petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez.

·         Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence.

·         RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity

·         CA reversed the judgment of the RTC. Specifically, it refused to be bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioner’s expert witness. The CA held the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient to establish Dominic’s psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying on the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag, Hernandez v. Court of Appeals and Pesca v. Pesca, the CA observed: In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without remorse for his dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily constitute a case of psychological incapacity. A person’s inability to share or take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, are indicative of an immature mind, but not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured. Even the respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent to psychological incapacity, nor does the fact that the respondent is a criminal suspect for estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to petitioner. 

ISSUE: WON the marriage should be declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. NO

HELD:

We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well taken and warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert; and that he also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.

Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in order to verify the facts derived from petitioner about Dominic’s psychological profile considering the ill-feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the only people she interviewed about Dominic were those whom petitioner herself referred. In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr. Samson’s findings. The CA rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such expert for being avowedly given to show compliance with the requirements set in Santos and Molina for the establishment of Dominic’s psychological incapacity.

The CA’s reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is easy to see why.

In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband."¹⁸ But here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on other people’s recollection and opinion for that purpose.

In Hernandez, we ruminated that:

xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent’s psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. But the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage.

The Court in Pesca observed that:

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical expert’s testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners’ failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

Petitioner’s view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent spouse therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his psychological incapacity is not entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as follows:

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos.

To qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of marriage, a person’s psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights and obligations between husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

Accordingly, the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity, antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with psychological incapacity. Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.

v  Finally, petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required, and that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be deemed to have become functus officio if not totally disregarded.

The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings. The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.