DEFINE LIFE: Administrative Law Case Doctrines

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DOCTRINES

By Olive Cachapero

Prof. Antonio G.M. La Viňa

MEMORIZE:

1987 Constitution, Art. 8, Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Doctrine of Separation of Powers

* Book II, Administrative Code of 1987

PLANAS VS. GIL

(Extensive authority over the public service is granted the President)

Non-interference Rule: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases.

But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that we are precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down "with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments" not only because "the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white" but also because "even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other." (Springer vs. Government [1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845, 852.) As far as the judiciary is concerned, while it holds "neither the sword nor the purse" it is by constitutional placement the organ called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme Court is entrusted expressly or by necessary implication the obligation of determining in appropriate cases the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent, the judiciary restrains the other departments of the government and this result is one of the necessary corollaries of the "system of checks and balance" of the government established.

GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. SPRINGER

(The appointment of managers of property or a business in which the government is interested essentially an executive act)

ISSUE: Where does the power to appoint to Public Office reside? W/N section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822 is constitutional and valid.

HELD: (1) The right to appoint to office has been confided, with certain well defined exceptions, by the Government of the United States to the executive branch of the government which it has set up in the Philippines; (2) Section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822 is unconstitutional and void

RATIO: The applicable legal doctrines are found in the Organic Law, particularly in the Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, and in statutes enacted under authority of that Act, and in decisions interpretative of it. It is true that the Organic Act contains no general distributing clause. But the principle is clearly deducible from the grant of powers. It is expressly incorporated in our Administrative Code. It has time and again been approvingly enforced by this court. No department of the Government of the Philippine Islands may legally exercise any of the powers conferred by the Organic Law upon any of the others. Again it is true that the Organic Law contains no such explicit prohibition. But it is fairly implied by the division of the Government into three departments. The effect is the same whether the prohibition is expressed or not. It has repeatedly been announced by this court that each of the branches of the Government is in the main independent of the others.

The Organic Act vests the:

a.) EXECUTIVE POWER in the Governor- General of the Philippine Islands.

Ø execute the law

Ø power of appointment; membership in the voting committee in question is an office or executive function

Ø he is given general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government of the Philippine Islands as far as is not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.

Ø made responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands and of the United States operative within Philippine Islands.

Ø By the Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as chief Executive of the Islands, is charged with the executive control of the Philippine Government, to be exercised in person or through the Secretaries of Departments, or other proper agency, according to law."

b.) LEGISLATIVE POWER except as otherwise provided therein to the Philippine Legislature.

Ø make the law.

c.) JUDICIAL POWER is conferred on the Supreme Courts, Courts of First Instance, and inferior courts.

Ø construe the law

Doctrine of separation of powers

Ø the Supreme Court emphasized that the power of appointment in the Philippines appertains, with minor exceptions, to the executive department; that membership in the voting committee in question is an office or executive function; that the NCC and similar corporations are instrumentalities of the Government; that the duty to look after government agencies and government property belongs to the executive department; that the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting committee constitutes an invasion by the Legislative Department of the privileges of the Executive Department. Under a system of government of delegated powers, under which delegation legislative power vests in the Philippine Legislature and executive power vests in the Governor-General, and under which Governor-General and a specified power of appointment resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly or indirectly perform functions of an executive nature through the designation of its presiding officers as majority members of a body which has executive functions. That is the meaning we gather from the tri-partite theory of the division of powers. That is the purport of the provisions of the Organic Law.

Section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. However, the Supreme Court notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

ARTICLE VIII

1987 Constitution, Art. 7 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987

BOOK 2 Chapter 4 JUDICIAL POWER Sec. 16. Judicial Power. - The judicial power shall be vested in one (1) Supreme Court, and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Such lower courts include the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Shari's District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and Shari'a Circuit Courts and they shall continue to exercise their respective jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and, in cases prescribed by law, to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

BOOK 3 POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

Sec. 1. Power of Control.- The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Chapter 5 POWER OF APPOINTMENT Sec. 16. Power of Appointment. - The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.

Chapter 6 GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Sec. 18. General Supervision Over Local Governments. - The President shall exercise general supervision over local governments.

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

Besides the constitution, the powers of the President of the Philippines are specifically outlined in Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. The following powers are:

1. Power of control over the executive branch

The President of the Philippines has the mandate of control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This includes restructuring, reconfiguring, and appointments of their respective officials. The Administrative Code also provides for the President to be responsible for the abovementioned offices’ strict implementation of laws.

2. Power ordinance power

The President of the Philippines has the power to give executive issuances, which are means to streamline the policy and programs of an administration. There are six issuances that the President may issue. They are the following as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987:

· Executive orders — Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.

· Administrative orders — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as the administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

· Proclamations — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

· Memorandum orders — Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail, or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or government office shall be embodied in memorandum orders.

· Memorandum circulars — Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus, or offices of the government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.

· General or special orders — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

It is important to note that during the term of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he used executive issuances known as presidential decrees as a form of legislation. These decrees have the full force and effect of laws because at the time the legislature did not exist and, when the 1973 Constitution was put into full force and effect, it gave the power to the President to do as such. This continued until the first year of President Corazon C. Aquino’s term. However, President Aquino opted to used executive orders instead of presidential decrees. President Aquino’s executive orders, however, still had the full force and effect of laws until the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

3. Power over aliens

The President of the Philippines has the power over non-Filipinos in the Philippines. The powers he may exercise over foreigners in the country are as follows:

The chief executive may have an alien in the Philippines deported from the country after due process.
The President may change the status of a foreigner, as prescribed by law, from a non-immigrant status to a permanent resident status without necessity of visa.
The President may choose to overrule the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration before their decision becomes final and executory (after 30 days of the issuance of the decision). The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration has jurisdiction over all deportation cases.
The president is also mandated by the Administrative Code of 1987 to exercise powers as recognized by the generally accepted principles of international law.

4. Powers of eminent domain, escheat, land reservation and recovery of ill-gotten wealth

The President of the Philippines has the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domains means the state has the power to seize or authorize the seizure of private property for public use with just compensation. There are two constitutional provisions, however, that limit the exercise of such power: Article III, Section 9 (1) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Furthermore, Article III, Section 9 (2), provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Once the aforementioned conditions are met, the President may exercise the power of eminent domain which are as follows:

· Power of eminent domain — The President shall determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the national government, and direct the solicitor general, whenever he deems the action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper court.

· Power to direct escheat or reversion proceedings — The President shall direct the solicitor general to institute escheat or reversion proceedings over all lands transferred or assigned to persons disqualified under the constitution to acquire land.

· Power to reserve lands of the public and private domain of the government —

1) The president shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation.

2) He shall also have the power to reserve from sale or other disposition and for specific public uses or purposes, any land belonging to the private domain of the government, or any of the friar lands, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law, and thereafter such land shall be used for the purposes specified by such proclamation until otherwise provided by law.

· Power over ill-gotten wealth — The President shall direct the solicitor general to institute proceedings to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees.

Within the period fixed in, or any extension thereof authorized by, the constitution, the President shall have the authority to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime, and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts.

5. Power of appointment

The President may appoint officials of the Philippine government as provided by the constitution and laws of the Philippines. Some of these appointments, however, may need the approval of the Committee on Appointments (a committee composed of members from the House of Representatives and the Senate of the Philippines).

6. Power of general supervision over local governments

The President of the Philippines, as chief executive, has the mandate to supervise local governments in the Philippines, despite their autonomous status as provided by Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

Traditionally, this is done by the Department of the Interior and Local Government, headed by a cabinet secretary—an alter ego of the President.

7. Other powers

Aside from the aforementioned powers of the President of the Philippines, he can also exercise powers enumerated in the constitution, and powers given to him by law.

OCCENA VS. COMELEC

(Delegating to administrative agencies the power to make rules and regulations.)

ISSUES:

(1) WON The 1973 Constitution and Javellana Ruling is Valid.

(2) WON The Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose such amendments.

HELD:

It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.

The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect.

Petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality.

The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof."

One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.

Creation, Reorganization and Abolition of Administrative Agencies

SEC. OF DOTC VS. MABALOT

(Power of the president to reorganize the government)

ISSUE: WON the administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary valid.

HELD:

YES. The President – through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case – may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.

Public Office may be created through any of the ff. modes:

1) by the Constitution,

2) by law, or

3) by authority of law.

The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode which could be decreed for instance, through and Executive Order issued by the President or an order of an administrative agency such as the Civil Service Commission under the Administrative Code. In the case at bar, the DOTC Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department Order pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36 of the President establishing the regional officer in the CAR.

The said Administrative Order did not merely authorize but directed the various departments and agencies of government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their regional offices in the CAR.

What law then gives the President the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government. In fine, the “designation” and subsequent “establishment” of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of LTFRB in the Cordillera Administrative Region and the concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, fall within the scope of the continuing authority of the President to effectively reorganize the Department of Transportation and Communications.

Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith, and, as a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.

EUGENIO VS. CSC

(Power of congress to abolish)

FACTS: Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. In 1993, Aida Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service Eligibility (CES). She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. But her appointment to said rank was impeded when in the same year, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) abolished the Career Executive Service Board (CESB).

CESB is the office tasked with promulgating rules, standards, and procedures on the selection, classification and compensation of the members of the Career Executive Service.

Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the CSC does not have the power to abolish CESB because the same was created by law (P.D. 1). CSC on the other hand argued that it has the power to do so pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 which granted the CSC the right to reorganize the CSC.

ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career Executive Service Board.

HELD:

NO. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB.

On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission. As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..

From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.”

The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit: Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.

LARIN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(Power of the president to dismiss)

ISSUE: WON the President has the power to dismiss.

HELD:

NONE. Under the law, Career Executive Service Officers, namely Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, are all appointed by the President.

Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct diciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the “power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” conferred to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.

This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. Specifically, Section 36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that the petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.

Powers of Administrative Agencies

PHIL. ASS. OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. VS. TORRES, ET AL

(Rule-making power of administrative body)

FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers. The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the afore mentioned order and to prohibit implementation.

ISSUES:

1) WON respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;

2) WON the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, areunreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and

3) WON the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.

HELD:

FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit: Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is here by authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society.

THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided; Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit: Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation; and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafterbe the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from thedate of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in therule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall takeappropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affectedby them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987). Prohibition granted

MATEO V. COURT OF APPEALS

(RTC without jurisdiction over civil action involving employee of quasi –public corporation)

ISSUE: WON the RTC of Rizal has jurisdiction over the case involving dismissal of an employee of quasi-public corporation.

HELD: No.

RATIO: MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. In Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commissions, the Court en banc ruled that employees of GOCCs with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

The established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. PD No. 807, EO 292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.

Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

The CSC under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the Civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's Certiorari judgment. Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.

CARINO V. CAPULONG

(Authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution a discretionary duty)

ISSUES:

1) WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction

2) WON the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution is a discretionary duty?

HELD:

(1)Yes

(2) Yes

RATIO:

(1) In the case at bar, private respondents' application for a permit to operate AMACC-Davao City as an educational institution was denied by the petitioners. Otherwise stated, the private respondents do not have a permit to operate or a certificate of recognition from the government to undertake educational or school operations. In fine, the private respondents do not have any existing right that needed to be protected during the pendency of their principal action for mandamus. Hence, the "closing" and/or "padlocking" of AMACC-Davao City would not and did not violate any right of the private respondents.

Moreover, it is not the function of the WPI to restrain a public officer from performing a duty imposed by law or to permit the doing of that which is declared unlawful. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the establishment and operation of schools are subject to the prior authorization of the government. And, as sanctions for operating without permit, the DECS is authorized either to impose the total closure of school and/or to disqualify the school from conferring title or degree in the non-recognized program or course of studies. In ordering the total closure of AMACC-Davao City, the petitioners were only performing their duties as public officers; hence, the respondent Judge should not have issued the writ of preliminary injunction. In issuing the writ, he allowed the private respondents to continue the operation of AMACC-Davao City as an educational institution without a permit or certificate of government recognition, thereby sanctioning the act which is unlawful.

(2) The action filed by the private respondents in the court below is a petition for mandamus to compel the petitioners to approve their application to operate AMACC-Davao City as an educational institution. As a rule, mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment.

In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners because it had to be exercised in accordance with — and not in violation of — the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant of permits is governed by law, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority to grant permit is vested upon the judgment of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the rules and regulations governing the recognition on private schools (Section 27, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).

Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed.

In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school without a permit in blatant violation of law. Public respondent has no ministerial duty to issue to petitioner a permit to operate a school in Davao City before petitioner has even filed an application or before his application has been first processed in accordance with the rules and regulations on the matter. Certainly, public respondent is not enjoined by any law to grant such permit or to allow such operation without a permit, without first processing an application. To do so is violation of the Educational Act

CARPIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ISSUE: WON RA 6975 violates Section 6, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which stall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

HELD:

NO.

This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerkand has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive."

SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.

This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as the independent Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other constitutionally created independent Office, namely, the Commission on Human Rights.

It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the AFP. As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.

Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature." ³¹ His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military." (Article II, Section 3, 1987 Constitution)

Finally, petitioner submits that the creation of a "Special Oversight Committee" under Section 84 of the Act, especially the inclusion therein of some legislators as members (namely: the respective Chairmen of the Committee on Local Government and the Committee on National Defense and Security in the Senate, and the respective Chairmen of the Committee on Public Order and Security and the Committee on National Defense in the House of Representatives) is an "unconstitutional encroachment upon and a diminution of, the President's power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices."

But there is not the least interference with the President's power of control under Section 84. The Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tasked solely with planning and overseeing the immediate "transfer, merger and/or absorption" into the Department of the Interior and Local Governments of the "involved agencies." This it will undertake in accordance with the phases of implementation already laid down in Section 85 of the Act and once this is carried out, its functions as well as the committee itself would cease altogether. ³² As an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it exercises, decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and in diminution of the power of control which properly belongs to the President. What is more, no executive department, bureau or office is placed under the control or authority, of the committee. ³³

As a last word, it would not be amiss to point out here that under the Constitution, there are the so-called independent Constitutional Commissions, namely: The Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections. (Article IX-A, Section 1)

As these Commissions perform vital governmental functions, they have to be protected from external influences and political pressures. Hence, they were made constitutional bodies, independent of and not under any department of the government. ³⁴ Certainly, they are not under the control of the President.

The Constitution also created an independent office called the "Commission on Human Rights." (Article XIII, Section 17[1]).However, this Commission is not on the same level as the Constitutional Commissions under Article IX, although it is independent like the latter Commissions. ³⁵ It still had to be constituted thru Executive Order No. 163 (dated May 5, 1987).

In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of a national police commission that will administer and control the national police force to be established thereunder.

This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as the independent Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other constitutionally created independent Office, namely, the Commission on Human Rights.

By way of resume, the three Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service, Audit, Elections) and the additional commission created by the Constitution (Human Rights) are all independent of the Executive; but the National Police Commission is not. In fact, it was stressed during the CONCOM deliberations that this commission would be under the President, and hence may be controlled by the President, thru his or her alter ego, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.

BLAQUERA V. ALCALA

(Presidential power of control over executive departments)

ISSUE: WON AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over executive departments.

HELD:

YES. Implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System has been decentralized to the President or to the head of each department of agency - „

In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment.

The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control over executive departments – “The president shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed” (Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution)

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute judgment of the former for that of the latter.

President was only exercising his power of control.

When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the President was just exercising his power of control over executive departments. This is decisively clear from the WHEREAS CLAUSES of AO 268 and AO 29. The President was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the President, thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. The President did not encroached upon the authority of the CSC to grant benefits in issuing AO 29 and AO 268

Delegation of Power

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC VS. POEA

(Undue delegation of legislative authority)

ISSUE: WON the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

HELD: YES.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

What Can Be Delegated:

Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

GR: Non-delegation of powers.

E: It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power (MEMORIZE!)

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,

1.) COMPLETENESS TEST - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.

2.) SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

Power Of Subordinate Legislation:

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

Accepted Sufficient Standards:

1) public interest;

2) justice and equity;

3) public convenience and welfare;

4) simplicity, economy and efficiency;

5) sense and experience of men; and

6) national security.

ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

Tests Of Delegation

(1) COMPLETENESS TEST - what is to be examined:

a) subject matter (what is delegated)

b) scope of the subject matter or measure

c) what job must be done

d) authority (who is to do it)

e) scope of authority

(2) SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST - what is to be examined:

a) legislative policy (“whereas” clauses)

b) specific administrative agency to apply the legislative policy

c) scope of the policy and the circumstances under which it is to be carried out

TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF DEPT. OF ENERGY

We hold that the power and obligation of this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of laws cannot be defeated by the fact that the challenged law carries serious economic implications. This Court has struck down laws abridging the political and civil rights of our people even if it has to offend the other more powerful branches of government. There is no reason why the Court cannot strike down R.A. No. 8180 that violates the economic rights of our people even if it has to bridle the liberty of big business within reasonable bounds.

PELAEZ VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL

(Sufficiency of standards)

ISSUE:WON Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD:

NO. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:

a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and

b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.

The SC declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

DOCTRINES:

The power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power". As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it, "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.

Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.

ADDITIONAL CASES

KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER VS. GARCIA, JR.,

An administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator or other public service.

Exception To The Exception:

The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegate non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it “necessary” to do so.

NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS

The Congress cannot further delegate the power delegated to it by the people. This is in keeping with the principle of non-delegation of powers which is applicable to all the three branches of the government. The rule states that what has been delegated cannot further be delegated – potestas delegata non delegari potest. A delegated power must be discharged directly by the delegate and not through the delegate’s agent. It is basically an ethical principle which requires direct performance by the delegate of an entrusted power. Further delegation therefore constitutes violation of the trust reposed by the delegator on the delegate. The people, through the Constitution, delegated lawmaking powers to the Congress, and as such, it cannot as a rule delegate further the same to another.

Exceptions:

a) In order to address the numerous and complex demands of legislative function, the Constitution provides exceptions to the rule. Further delegation is permitted in the following cases:
a) Delegation to the people at large. The Congress further delegates its legislative power by allowing direct legislation by the people in cases of initiative and referendum;

b) Delegation of emergency powers to the President. Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution states that “in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.” Emergency powers are delegated to the President by the Congress to effectively solve the problems caused by war or other crisis which the Congress could not otherwise solve with more dispatch than the President;

c) Delegation of tariff powers to the President. Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution states that “the Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.” Tariff powers are delegated to the President by the Congress to efficiently and speedily solve economic problems posed by foreign trade which the Congress could not otherwise address with more dispatch than the President;

d) Delegation to administrative bodies. The Congress delegates the so called “power of subordinate legislation” to administrative bodies. Due to the growing complexity of modern society, it has become necessary to allow specialized administrative bodies to promulgate supplementary rules, so that they can deal with technical problems with more expertise and dispatch than the Congress or the courts. Regulations or supplementary rules passed by the administrative bodies are intended to fill-in the gaps and provide details to what is otherwise a broad statute passed by Congress. For the rules and regulations to be valid and binding, they must be in accordance with the statute on which they are based, complete in themselves, and fix sufficient standards. If any of the requirements is not satisfied, the regulation will not be allowed to affect private rights; and

e) Delegation to the local governments. This delegation is based on the principle that the local government is in better position than the national government to act on purely local concerns. Legislative power is therefore given to them for effective local legislation.

NON-DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.¹⁹⁵ Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.

EXCEPTIONS TO NON-DELEGABILITY

a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and

b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

NON-DELEGABILITY vs. RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making). The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v. Maceren as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."

x x x x

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

The doctrine of presidential control over the executive department likewise furnishes no basis to uphold the validity of EO 378. As distinguished from supervision, the doctrine of control finds application in altering acts of the President’s subordinates. It does not sanction structural or functional changes even within the executive department. This is apparent from the following canonical distinction of the two doctrines: “In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what asubordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.”

Quasi legislative power or Rule Making Power

ABELLA, JR.. V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

RATIO: Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and enforce rules and regulations to carry out its mandate. In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define and identify positions covered by the Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines to meet this objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.

On petitioner’s averment that he was not afforded due process for CSC’s alleged failure to notify him of a hearing relating to the issuance of the challenged Circular, is not convincing. The issuance of the circular was an exercise of a quasi-legislative function as such, prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.

Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment. The appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, merely examines the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointee’s possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification. In sum, while petitioner was able to demonstrate his standing to appeal the CSC Resolutions to the courts, he failed to prove his eligibility to the position he was appointed to.

DOCTRINES:

1.) Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.”

Significantly, “the selection of the appointee -- taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality -- is the prerogative of the appointing authority.” No tribunal, not even this Court, may compel the exercise of an appointment for a favored person.

The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing authority’s discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it allows the appointing authority to request reconsideration or appeal.

2.) The classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative, not a quasi-judicial, issuance. This distinction determines whether prior notice and hearing are necessary

In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of this function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements, as enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed. These requirements include prior notice and hearing.

On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.

Significantly, the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to heads of departments, bureaus and agencies. It needed no prior publication, since it had been issued as an incident of the administrative body’s power to issue guidelines for government officials to follow in performing their duties.

SMART COMMUNICATION V. NTC

(Quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers distinguished)

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.^[17] They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, it was held:

The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.

Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, petitioners were able to register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their respective position papers setting forth their objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing circular. After the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3, 200 and July 5, 2000, asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the so-called Billing Circular. These letters were not acted upon until October 6, 2000, when respondent NTC issued the second assailed Memorandum implementing certain provisions of the Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of the requests contained in their previous letters, thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.

In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. In Drilon v. Lim, it was held:

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, B.P. 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioners averred that the Circular contravened Civil Code provisions on sales and violated the constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law. These are within the competence of the trial judge. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards – and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of our population – and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. VS. CA

(Nature of quasi-legislative power)

“It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Here as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for a service, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character.

Its legislative purpose is the “rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports. We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088.

“Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.” It is axiomatic that an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.

ARANETA VS. GATMAITAN

(Administrative regulation must be reasonable)

ISSUE: WON the President is empowered by law to issue the executive orders.

HELD:

YES. The words found in Secs. 6, 13 and 75 of Act 4003 (The Fisheries Law), as amended by Sec. 1 of CA 471, clearly declare unlawful and fixes the penalty for the taking, except for scientific or educational purposes or propagation, destroying or killing of any fish or fish eggs. Said provisions authorize the Agriculture and Natural Resources Secretary to promulgate regulations restricting the use of any fish net or fishing device for the protection of fry or fish eggs, and establish reservations/fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner he prescribes. Hence, with or without the questioned Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing are within the powers of the Agriculture and Natural Resources Secretary.

The President, being the head of the Executive Department, can exercise the same power and authority as mandated by Sec. 10 (1), Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “the President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

Sec. 63 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “administrative acts and commands of the President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the general performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be made in executive orders.”

Sec 74 of the same Code provides that “All executive functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under the Executive Departments subject to the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines in matters of general policy. The Departments are established for the proper distribution of the work of the Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that each branch of the administration may have a chief responsible for its direction and policy. Each Department Secretary shall assume the burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of the Government under his control and supervision.”

Sec. 79-A of the same Code provides, in part, that “executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective Department."

The President’s exercise of such authority does not constitute undue delegation of powers of Congress because

The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of law consists in that the former necessarily involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; the latter can be done.

The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If a law is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the official to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the office, the act is delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

THE POWER TO DELEGATE. — The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

TAYUG RURAL BANK VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILS

(Administrative rule with penal sanction)

ISSUE: WON the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty on Appellee's past overdue loans beginning July 4, 1965, by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 dated December 23, 1964.

HELD:

NO. Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law. There are, however, limitations to the rule-making power of administrative agencies. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement given legislation, all that is required is that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. The rule delineating the extent of the binding force to be given to administrative rules and regulations was explained by the Court in Teoxon v. Member of the Board of Administrators (33 SCRA 588), thus: "The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, as necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.

The Court held in the same case that "A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statute granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom ...." On the other hand, "administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means." Indeed, it cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative, executive office, or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Hence an administrative agency cannot impose a penalty not so provided in the law authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations, much less one that is applied retroactively.

Quasi-Judicial Power

DOLE PHILIPPINES INC. V. ESTEVA

(Nature of quasi-judicial power)

ISSUE/S: WON the DOLE Secretary is in the nature of having/exercising quasi-judicial power.

HELD:

YES. The DOLE Secretary is in the nature of having/exercising quasi-judicial power.

It is obvious that the visitorial and enforcement power granted to the DOLE Secretary is in the nature of a quasi-judicial power. Quasi-judicial power has been described by this Court in the following manner –

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

The DOLE Secretary, under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, exercise quasi-judicial power, at least, to the extent necessary to determine violations of labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor legislation. He can issue compliance orders and writs of execution for the enforcement of his orders. As evidence of the importance and binding effect of the compliance orders of the DOLE Secretary, Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, further provides –

ART. 128. Visitorial and enforcement power. –

x x x x

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct, impede, delay or otherwise render ineffective the orders of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives issued pursuant to the authority granted under this article, and no inferior court or entity shall issue temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order or otherwise assume jurisdiction over any case involving the enforcement orders issued in accordance with this article.

The Orders of DOLE Regional Director Parel, dated 19 September 1993, and of DOLE Undersecretary Trajano, dated 15 September 1994, consistently found that CAMPCO was engaging in labor-only contracting. Such finding constitutes res judicata in the case filed by the respondents with the NLRC.

It is well-established in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata, which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority, applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments or resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations, so as to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in the Philippine justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations.

Res judicata has dual aspects, "bar by prior judgment" and "conclusiveness of judgment." This Court has previously clarified the difference between the two –

Section 49, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the dual aspects of res judicata in actions in personam. to wit:

"Effect of judgment. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:

x x x x

(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto."

Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata known as "bar by prior judgment," whereas, Section 49(c) is referred to as "conclusiveness of judgment."

There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. When the three identities are present, the judgment on the merits rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. But where between the first case wherein Judgment is rendered and the second case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is only identity of parties but there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed "conclusiveness of judgment."

The second concept of res judicata, conclusiveness of judgment, is the one applicable to the case at bar.

CUENCA VS. ATAS

(Cardinal primary requirements of procedural due process)

ISSUE: WON the Petitioner is right when he challenged the CA decision on the ground that he was denied due process.

HELD:No.

RATIO: In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings where the magistrates or tribunals hearing the case are not bound by the niceties and finer points of judicial due process, the “CARDINAL PRIMARY” REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS:

1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x

2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must considerthe evidence presented. x x x

3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. x x x

4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O.G. 1335), but the evidence must be “substantial.” x x x

5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. x x x

6) The [c]ourt x x x or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. x x x

7) [The court] should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Indeed, the rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority.

It is well-settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be binding and final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the records of the case. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence and the credibility of witnesses presented before the lower court, tribunal, or office, as we are not a trier of facts. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latter’s findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court.

VIVO vs. PAGCOR

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.

LEDESMA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Doctrine of due process in administrative proceedings

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

· Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires.

SANTIAGO VS. ALIKPALA

First requirement of procedural due process, namely, the existence of the court or tribunal clothed with judicial, or quasi-judicial, power to hear and determine the matter before it.

There is the express admission in the statement of facts that respondents, as a court-martial, were not convened to try petitioner but someone else, the action taken against petitioner being induced solely by a desire to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow then that the absence of a competent court or tribunal is most marked and undeniable. Such a denial of due process is therefore fatal to its assumed authority to try petitioner.

FABELLA vs. CA

In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:

1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights;

2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;

3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and

4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.

MADENILLA vs. CSC

Due process of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, and property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of the light in the matter involved."

The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is not always the cornerstone of due process. In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

SEC VS. GMA NETWORK, INC.

Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a person’s right to property.

LEGISLATIVE v. QUASI-JUDICIAL:

When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

CARINO VS. CHR

The CHR has the power to investigate but not to adjudicate alleged human right violation.

Investigate – means to examine, inquire, explore.

Adjudicate – to resolve, rule, settle, decide.

MEGAWORLD GLOBUS ASIA VS. DSM CONSTRUCTION

Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

LUPANGCO vs. CA

Quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.

SCENARIOS, INC. VS. VINLUAN

(Technical rules not applicable)

ISSUE: WON Scenarios Inc., was denied of procedural due process.

HELD: NO. Service of notices and resolutions, including summons, in cases filed before the labor arbiters is governed by Sections 5 and 6 of Rule III of the New NLRC Rules of Procedure.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that unless the contrary is proven, official duty is presumed to have been performed regularly and judicial proceedings regularly conducted. This presumption of the regularity of the quasi-judicial proceedings before the NLRC includes the presumption of regularity of service of summons and other notices. It is therefore incumbent upon herein petitioners to rebut that legal presumption with competent and proper evidence, for the return of the registered mail as “unclaimed” is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein.

PISON-ARCEO AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. NLRC

(Procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed)

ISSUE: WON the NLRC decision is valid and binding upon petitioner PADC even when it was not impleaded in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the subsequent appeal to the NLRC.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO:The Supreme Court stressed that in quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. Also, in labor cases, punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of the working man; it should not defeat the complete and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties. The Court said that it is ever mindful of the underlying spirit and intention of the Labor Code to ascertain the facts of each case speedily and objectively without regard to technical rules of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. So long as there is a substantial compliance, a party can be placed under the jurisdiction of the labor court.

In the case at bar, there is substantial compliance when summons was served to Jose Edmundo Pison who was also the administrator of the Hacienda. Petitioner is therefore adequately represented by Pison in the proceedings in the labor tribunal. If at all, the non-inclusion of the corporate name of PADC in the case before the executive labor arbiter was a mere procedural error which did not at all affect the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals.

PASCUAL VS BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

(Right against self-incrimination)

UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION VS. LAGUESMA

SEC. 3. Employees' Right to Self-Organization. -- Employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection. Individuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of employees under their supervision but may form separate organizations of their own.

For its part, the Supreme Court upheld in several of its decisions the right of supervisors to organize for purposes of labor relations.

Although it had a definition of the term "supervisor," the Industrial Peace Act did not define the term "manager." But, using the commonly-understood concept of "manager," as above stated, it is apparent that the law used the term "supervisors" to refer to the sub-group of "managerial employees" known as front-line managers. The other sub-group of "managerial employees," known as managers per se, was not covered.

However, in Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, the right of all managerial employees to self-organization was upheld as a general proposition, thus:

It would be going too far to dismiss summarily the point raised by respondent Company - that of the alleged identity of interest between the managerial staff and the employing firm. That should ordinarily be the case, especially so where the dispute is between management and the rank and file. It does not necessarily follow though that what binds the managerial staff to the corporation forecloses the possibility of conflict between them. There could be a real difference between what the welfare of such group requires and the concessions the firm is willing to grant. Their needs might not be attended to then in the absence of any organization of their own. Nor is this to indulge in empty theorizing. The record of respondent Company, even the very case cited by it, is proof enough of their uneasy and troubled relationship. Certainly the impression is difficult to erase that an alien firm failed to manifest sympathy for the claims of its Filipino executives. To predicate under such circumstances that agreement inevitably marks their relationship, ignoring that discord would not be unusual, is to fly in the face of reality.

. . . The basic question is whether the managerial personnel can organize. What respondent Company failed to take into account is that the right to self-organization is not merely a statutory creation. It is fortified by our Constitution. All are free to exercise such right unless their purpose is contrary to law. Certainly it would be to attach unorthodoxy to, not to say an emasculation of, the concept of law if managers as such were precluded from organizing. Having done so and having been duly registered, as did occur in this case, their union is entitled to all the rights under Republic Act No. 875. Considering what is denominated as unfair labor practice under Section 4 of such Act and the facts set forth in our decision, there can be only one answer to the objection raised that no unfair labor practice could be committed by respondent Company insofar as managerial personnel is concerned. It is, as is quite obvious, in the negative.

Right of Self-Organization of Managerial Employees under the Labor Code

Thus, the dictum in the Caltex case which allowed at least for the theoretical unionization of top and middle managers by assimilating them with the supervisory group under the broad phrase "managerial personnel," provided the lynchpin for later laws denying the right of self-organization not only to top and middle management employees but to front line managers or supervisors as well. Following the Caltex case, the Labor Code, promulgated in 1974 under martial law, dropped the distinction between the first and second sub-groups of managerial employees. Instead of treating the terms "supervisor" and "manager" separately, the law lumped them together and called them "managerial employees," as follows:

ART. 212. Definitions . . . .

(k) "Managerial Employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not falling within this definition are considered rank and file employees for purposes of this Book.

The definition shows that it is actually a combination of the commonly understood definitions of both groups of managerial employees, grammatically joined by the phrase "and/or."

This general definition was perhaps legally necessary at that time for two reasons. First, the 1974 Code denied supervisors their right to self-organize as theretofore guaranteed to them by the Industrial Peace Act. Second, it stood the dictum in the Caltex case on its head by prohibiting all types of managers from forming unions. The explicit general prohibition was contained in the then Art. 246 of the Labor Code.

The practical effect of this synthesis of legal concepts was made apparent in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which the Department of Labor promulgated on January 19, 1975. Book V, Rule II, §11 of the Rules provided:

Supervisory unions and unions of security guards to cease operation. - All existing supervisory unions and unions of security guards shall, upon the effectivity of the Code, cease to operate as such and their registration certificates shall be deemed automatically cancelled. However, existing collective agreements with such unions, the life of which extends beyond the date of effectivity of the Code, shall be respected until their expiry date insofar as the economic benefits granted therein are concerned.

Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition of managerial employees shall become eligible to join or assist the rank and file labor organization, and if none exists, to form or assist in the forming of such rank and file organization. The determination of who are managerial employees and who are not shall be the subject of negotiation between representatives of the supervisory union and the employer. If no agreement is reached between the parties, either or both of them may bring the issue to the nearest Regional Office for determination.

The Department of Labor continued to use the term "supervisory unions" despite the demise of the legal definition of "supervisor" apparently because these were the unions of front line managers which were then allowed as a result of the statutory grant of the right of self-organization under the Industrial Peace Act. Had the Department of Labor seen fit to similarly ban unions of top and middle managers which may have been formed following the dictum in Caltex, it obviously would have done so. Yet it did not, apparently because no such unions of top and middle managers really then existed.

DELFIN VS. INCIONG

(Res Adjudicata)

FACTS: The 136 petitioners herein are former employees of private respondent Atlantic Container Corporation, organized themselves into Atlantic Container Employees Organization (ACCO) and affiliated with the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU).

Claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private respondent Roberto Jacinto, refused to implement the Collective Bargaining Agreement, petitioners and FEDLU held a strike. Thereafter, ACCO and FEDLU filed a case in the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR found Atlantic Container Corporation and Jacinto guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering them to cease and desist from further committing the same and to reinstate complaints striking members. They filed motions to reconsider the said decision, presumably for the reinstatement of all the petitioners, but the CIR denied the motions.

The petitioners again filed a charge with the CIR alleging that the named respondents established a corporation which was an alter ego of Atlantic and which was allegedly organized to engage in the identical business as Atlantic Container, absorbing all the assets including the facilities and machineries.

When the CIR was abolished, the case was transferred to NLRC which ordered the reinstatement of complainants. Only 86 out of the 136 petitioners were ordered reinstated. The appeal was dismissed, based on the ground of Res Judicata. Petitioners appealed to the Minister of Labor through respondent Deputy Minister Inciong who affirmed the NLRC decision.

ISSUE: WON the cause of action was barred by the principle of Res Judicata

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: While it is true that the complainant in the first charge was the union, in reality it had no material interest in the outcome of the case. The real party who stands to be benefited or defeated by the case brought in the name of the union is the union members themselves. Since the judgment therein had become final and executory, the subsequent filing of another charge against Atlantic for the same violations committed during its existence is barred by Res Judicata. The bringing of the same action in the name of the individual members of the union will not take out the case from the ambit of the principle of Res Judicata.

JUDGE BASILLA VS. BECAMON (additional)

Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes dismissible. The Court held that applied the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again. This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.”

ABELITA VS. DORIA (additional)

For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be present:

a. the former judgment or order must be final;

b. it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;

c. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and

d. there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action; this requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same parties.

ADDITIONAL CASES

QUASI JUDICIAL

The Court has classified the functions the COMELEC exercises into the quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, and administrative in Bedol v. Commission on Elections, to wit:

The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz:

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

I emphasize without hesitation that in order to properly proceed against the COMELEC, an aggrieved party must choose the proper remedy. The choice depends on which function – quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, and administrative – the COMELEC has discharged in doing the assailed action. It is true that pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,^[3] the remedy of an aggrieved party against a judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC is a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 brought in the Supreme Court. In Macabago v. Commission on Elections,^[4] however, the Court has clarified that Rule 64 applies only to the judgments or final orders or final resolutions rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function (that is, “the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications”).

Meaning and Characteristics of Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Power

1) adjudicatory power involves specific parties

2) exercise of the power is done in a judicial manner

3) exercised by a person or body other than a judge

4) requires notice and hearing

5) set different requirements before going to court

6) when a body is exercising quasi-judicial function, it is co-equal with the RTC

SANADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined.

Quasi-Judicial Function

As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and “co-equal bodies have no power to control the other.” However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgment…of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial bodies, E.O. 14 specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. VS. SEC OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE v. QUASI-JUDICIAL:

REQUIREMENTS FOR VALID EXERCISE

(1) Jurisdiction

Q: How is jurisdiction determined?

A: Jurisdiction is conferred by law and by the Constitution. Thus, in order to determine who has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, one only needs to look at the law whether or not it confers jurisdiction on the body.

Q: How do you resolve a conflict of jurisdiction between a quasi-judicial body and the court?

A: First, determine what the controversy is all about. Is the plaintiff questioning whether an administrative body has a certain power? Or is he questioning how said power was exercised? In the first, the particular law creating the body must be considered in order to determine whether or not the administrative body has authority. If the law has been entrusted to that body for its implementation and such law vests authority in said body, then it has jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, if the case puts in issue, not whether the body has authority, but the questionable manner it is exercised, then the courts have jurisdiction to determine whether or not in the exercise of such powers rights and obligations have been impaired.

(2) Due Process

Q: What is meant by “opportunity to be heard?”

A: It is the essence of due process. Due process in administrative proceedings includes the opportunity to be heard OR the opportunity to explain one’s side OR the opportunity to seek reconsideration UNLESS administrative rules on proceeding do not allow such motion for reconsideration. Thus, “an opportunity to be heard” does not require physical presence; for as long as the party is provided a remedy with which he can appeal his case or seek relief from an adverse judgment, then due process is complied with.

Res judicata in administrative decisions

OCHO VS. CALOS,

The doctrine of res judicata applies to both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The doctrine actually embraces two concepts: the first is “bar by prior judgment” and the second is “conclusiveness of judgment.”

The second concept is explained thus: The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of litigation. Thus it extends to questions ‘necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all the matters which are essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed or decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion upon which such conclusion is based is as effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is solved.

QUASI LEGISLATIVE

Doctrine of “Subordinate Legislation”; Limitations

· rule-making power

· cannot contravene a statute or the Constitution

· rules are not laws but have the force and effect of laws - partakes of the nature of statute

· enjoy presumption of legality - therefore courts should respect and apply them UNLESS declared invalid; all other agencies should likewise respect them

Q: Distinguish between Legislative and Quasi-Legislative power.

Legislative	Quasi-Legislative
vested in the Legislature	power is in the nature of subordinate legislation or the rule-making power delegated to administrative bodies
plenary	not plenary and therefore subject to limitations – e.g. Constitution, statute, and administrative law limitations such as the tests for valid delegation.
includes the power to determine what the law is and how it shall be applied.	includes the power to determine how the law is to be applied but not what the law is; administrative bodies cannot determine the legality or illegality of an act, NOT UNLESS they are duly authorized by Congress

Q: Distinguish between Judicial and Quasi-Judicial power.

Judicial	Quasi-Judicial
is original, vested in the judiciary	is derivative, a product of valid delegation of power to administrative bodies.
includes the determination of rights and obligations conclusively	temporary in nature as courts have the final say
a primary power exercised by the judiciary	is incidental to the primary function of administrative bodies of implementing and enforcing laws.

(NOTA BENE: It is called “quasi-judicial” because it is a power that belongs to the judiciary but is exercised by a non-judicial body. In addition, it is only incidental to the primary function of implementation and enforcement of laws.)

Q: Why is it important to distinguish between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power?

A: It is important to distinguish between these two powers of administrative bodies because there are certain rules and principles in administrative law, which apply to one but not to the other. Thus, the requirements of due process (notice & hearing) apply when the administrative body is exercising quasi-judicial functions because such power includes the determination of rights and obligations. On the other hand, there is generally no need of prior notice & hearing in the exercise of quasi-legislative power. Likewise the prior exhaustion of remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction do not apply in quasi-legislative processes, and only in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. And finally, a body exercising quasi-judicial functions is considered equivalent to a regional trial court. Hence, one can seek relief from its judgment by appealing to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on the mode of appeal. A body exercising quasi-legislative functions is not considered equivalent to a court. Hence, one can resort to the regional trial court to obtain relief.

Administrative Appeal and Review

SUYAT JR. VS. TORRES

(Appeal to the president)

TAN VS. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

(Appeal To The President)

FACTS: Tan submitted his application for the bidding of a land. Questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder. Meanwhile, Tan won the bidding process. However, President Garcia directed the declaration of the subject land as watershed forest land, hence not available for exploitation. As a result, Director of Forestry revoked the award to Tan. Tan filed a case in court.

ISSUE: WON the appeal to the court is the proper remedy.

HELD: No.

Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs. Fuertes, held that:

At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted the administrative remedies, is untenable.

The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case.

In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps, this Court stressed the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, thus:

When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the government the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. The administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted before resort can be had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive department of the government. When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department of the government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed and modified by them.

Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy. In the case at bar, petitioner- appellant's speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.

The proper remedy is an appeal to the OPRES. When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the government the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. The administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted before resort can be had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive department of the government. When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department of the government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed and modified by them"

CALO VS. FUERTES

(Withdrawal of appeal)

The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case.

Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court lies only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner.

law library

The judgment appealed from already had become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.

Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action

FORTICH VS. CORONA

(Failure to file motion for reconsideration)

The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:

“SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.

“Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.”

It is further provided for in Section 9 that “The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.”

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. BATHAN-VELASCO

(Finality of factual determination by administrative body)

ISSUE: WON SSSEA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: When a party fails to exhaust all administrative remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition.

Moreover, the issues raised by SSSEA in its special civil action for certiorari involve a review of the factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or officials. Judicial review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination.

Judicial Review

MACAILING, ET AL VS. ANDRADA, ET AL

(Mere silence of a statute on availability of judicial review does not necessarily imply that it is unavailable)

In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available

The pertinent statutory provision, Section 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, reads: "Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction ... (h) Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have the power to issue writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective provinces and district in the manner provided in the Rules of Court." Complementary thereto is Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court,4 providing that: "The petition may be filed ... if it relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in a Court of First instance having jurisdiction thereof."

Citing several cases, even if the action done is not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, "The Preliminary injunction that may be granted by a court of first instance under said Section 2 [Rule 58] is, in its application, co-extensive with the territorial boundaries of the province or district in which the said court sits

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. LOPEZ

(Quantum required is substantial evidence)

Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court. Weight and Sufficiency of

Evidence

Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Section 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)

DELA CRUZ vs. MALUNAO

The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is substantial evidence. In Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, substantial evidence is defined:

In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order.

For these reasons, only substantial evidence is required to find Malunao guilty of the administrative offense. In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof provided under the Rules of Court. In assessing whether there is substantial evidence in administrative investigations such as this case, the Court is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence.

MARCELO V. BUNGUBUNG,

Substantial evidence and laid down guidelines relative to the conduct of judicial review of decisions rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial power, viz:

x x x Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the
power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

GONZALES VS. CA

The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.

The proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to move for a reconsideration of the orders of the Regional Director, or to go directly to the DARAB, or to its executive adjudicator in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Prior resort to these administrative bodies will not only satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may likewise prove advantageous to the parties as the proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will not be limited by the technical rules of procedure and evidence. From there, the petitioner has yet another forum available--the Special Agrarian Courts which are the final determinants of cases involving land valuation or determination of just compensation.

Thus, the procedural short-cut taken by the petitioner which finds no justification both in law and in jurisprudence must be considered fatal to the petitioner's cause of action. Accordingly, we rule that the CA committed no error in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

NFA VS. CA

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is subject to some limitations and exceptions. In this case, private respondents’ contracts were terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely five days after their termination. In fact, respondent Masada, a prequalified bidder, submitted all requirements and was preparing for the public bidding only to find out that contracts had already been awarded by negotiation. Indeed, an appeal to the NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The urgency of the situation compelled private respondents to go to court to stop the implementation of these negotiated security contracts.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. NAVARRO

Exceptions: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

VDA. DE TAN VS. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION

FACTS: Maria Natividad Vda. de Tan filed before the CFI a petition for mandamus seeking an order to compel the respondent: (1) to declare deceased Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese National. Entitled to back pay rights, privileges, and prerogatives under R.A. No. 304, as amended by R.A. No. 897; and (2) to give due course to the claim of the petitioner, as the widow of the said veterans, by issuing to her the corresponding back pay certificate of indebtedness.

The lower court granted the petition and ordered the respondent Commission to give due course to the claim of herein petitioner to the back pay to which her husband was entitled as member of a duly recognized guerrilla organization. However, respondent avers in this appal that the petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner required to exhaust available administrative remedies in the present case?

HELD: No.

RATIO:The respondent Commission is n estoppel to invoke the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies, considering that in its resolution, it declared that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice were “Advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse,” thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor wold be accepted by the Commission.

BORDALLOVS. PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION

As a rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute but admits of exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the question is purely legal, such as the one presented in the case at bar. The failure of petitioners to appeal to the PRC, therefore, is not fatal to petitioners’ cause.

KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG

PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA,IINC. VS. DOMINGUEZ

ISSUE:Whether or not suit brought by KBMBPM is premature due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the ground that KBMBPM should have petitioned directly the Secretary of Agriculture to reverse the Order stripping the KBMBPM Board of its authority

HELD:

No.

As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, suchas when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. VS.CA

Primary jurisdiction involves matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

ROXAS AND COMPANY INC. VS. CA

(Inapplicability of the doctrine)

However, failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.

To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till.

PIMENTEL, ., ET AL VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE

FACTS:

Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

HELD:

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.

GSIS vs. COA (additional)

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction would ordinarily preclude us from resolving the matter, which calls for a ruling to be first made by the Board. It is the latter that is vested by law with exclusive and original jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising under RA 8291, as well as other matters related thereto.

However, both the GSIS and respondents have extensively discussed the merits of the case in their respective pleadings and did not confine their arguments to the issue of jurisdiction. Respondents, in fact, submit that we should resolve the main issue on the ground that it is a purely legal question. Respondents further state that a remand of the case to the Board would merely result in unnecessary delay and needless expense for the parties.

SEC. OF DPWH VS. ARNULFO AQUINO (ADDITIONAL)

There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice.

GUY VS. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION (additional)

Judicial intervention, however, should be granted in cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct in deportation proceeding.

PRIMARY JURISDICTION and EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency.^[9] In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.

Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court, in a long line of cases,^[11] has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court’s power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit:

a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;

b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;

c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;

d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;

e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;

f) where judicial intervention is urgent;

g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage;

h) where the controverted acts violate due process;

i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;

j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

k) where strong public interest is involved; and

l) in quo warranto proceedings.

Administrative Procedure

· Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987

· Executive Order No. 26 - Prescribing procedure and sanctions to ensure speedy disposition of administrative cases

DISCRETIONARY vs. MINISTERIAL

ROBLE ARRASTRE, INC. vs. VILLAFLOR and the CA

On Mootnes

At the outset, we state our concurrence with the Court of Appeals when it entered a new judgment dismissing Special Civil Action No. H-237 on the ground of mootness. The appellate court ratiocinated, to wit:

Lastly, it would seem that the main prayer of the complaint, that is, to compel the respondent mayor to issue a business license for the year 1994, by the passage of time during which this case pends, had already become moot and academic. A new application is necessary for the year 1995 and the year 1996 which is about to end. And in the grant or denial of such application for business permits or licenses, the respondent mayor must examine closely the circumstances prevailing and again use her discretion in the exercise of her official function. Accordingly, the issue at hand is already academic and it is well established that courts will not adjudicate moot cases nor hear a case when the object sought is not attainable and it will decline jurisdiction over moot cases which must involve only actual interests.

Indeed, Courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. However, we are constrained to render judgment herein pursuant to our symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar. For another, this case comes within the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is “capable of repetition yet evading review.”

On Discretion

The crux of the instant controversy is whether respondent mayor can be compelled by a writ of mandamus to grant petitioner’s application for a renewal of a business permit to operate an arrastre service at the Municipal Port of Hilongos in Leyte.

Ostensibly, it is petitioner’s contention that respondent mayor’s power to issue permits as contained in the aforesaid law is ministerial; hence, mandamus lies.

It bears to reiterate this Court’s ruling on the nature of the writ of mandamus. The writ of mandamus serves to compel a respondent who fails to perform a legal duty or unlawfully excludes another from the enjoyment of an entitled right or office to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner. Otherwise stated, mandamus is issued to command the performance of a ministerial, but not a discretionary duty.

It may be true, as argued by petitioner, that Resolution No. 93-27, which was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, is not an ordinance but merely a resolution. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently - a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

However, the fact that Resolution No. 93-27 is a “mere” resolution can do nil to support petitioner’s cause. As stated earlier, the proper action is certiorari to determine whether grave abuse of discretion had been committed on the part of respondent mayor in the refusal to grant petitioner’s application. Petitioner’s petition for mandamus is incompetent against respondent mayor’s discretionary power. Thus:

“Discretion,” when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law or acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment

DISCRETION DEFINED.

Discretion may be defined as "the act or the liberty to decide according to the principles of justice and one's ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without wilfullness or favor." (standard Dictionary, ed. 1911.) Mr. Webster defines discretion as the "freedom to act according to one's own judgment; unrestrained exercised of choice or will."

Mr. Black in his valuable law dictionary says:

Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. . . .

Mr. Bouvier defines discretion as follows:

That part of the judicial function which decides questions arising in the trial of a cause, according to the particular circumstances of each case, and as to which the judgment of the court is uncontrolled by fixed rules of law. The power exercised by courts to determine question to which no strict law is applicable but which, from their nature, and the circumstances of the case, are controlled by the personal judgment of the court.

Judge Sanborn, in his article on mandamus (26 Cyc., 161) defines discretion, when applied to public functionaries, as the power or right conferred upon them by law acting officially under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment or conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.

MINISTERIAL DUTY DEFINED.

A purely ministerial act, in constradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of impropriety if the act done. A ministerial act is one as to which nothing is left to the discretion of the person who must perform. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. It is a precise act accurately marked out, enjoined upon particular officers for a particular purpose. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, the duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.

CODILLA, SR. V. DE VENECIA

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and notministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

MALLARI vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS

Examples:

· The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. We agree with the contention of the petitioners that it was the ministerial duty of the trial court to approve the notice of appeal. It must be observed that the petitioners had filed within the prescribed period a notice of appeal on December 1, 1987 when the petition in question was denied by the trial court in an order dated November 9, 1987, a copy of which was received by the petitioners on November 27, 1987. The refusal of the trial court, therefore, to accept the said notice filed by petitioners in pursuance of their statutory right to appeal is clearly enforceable by mandamus.

Ø Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment. A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. But if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL INQUIRY, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:

Government Agencies

Monday, February 16, 2015

Administrative Law Case Doctrines

No comments:

Post a Comment